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Executive Summary 
In 2007, international shipping emitted 870 million tons of CO2, which represents 
about 2.7 percent of worldwide CO2 emissions and it is expected that the emissions 
from ships will continue to increase significantly in the near future. Against this 
background, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) is currently discussing different approaches aiming at 
reducing emissions in the maritime sector, in particular market-based mechanisms 
such as a levy on bunker fuel or a maritime emission trading scheme (ETS). 
In this paper, we assess potential implications of a maritime ETS on the organisation 
and operations of shipping companies, primarily by means of a case study involving 
ship operators. On the basis of our results, we discuss whether and how a maritime 
ETS needs to make special provisions to account for frequently raised criticisms in the 
context of cap-and-trade, for example high transaction costs and issues associated to 
a fixed cap on emissions such as high price volatility and excessive costs in times of 
unexpected high demand for shipping services. 
Our results suggest that any additional costs for monitoring and reporting of 
emissions are expected to play only a minor role in the context of a maritime ETS, 
since for business reasons ship operators already undertake comprehensive 
monitoring and reporting efforts for bunker fuel usage. With regard to the costs for 
potential trading activities, it is to be expected that compared to other operational 
costs, the additional expenditures will be rather small. The issues associated to a fixed 
cap cannot be ruled out as easily and are also identified by the interviewed experts as 
potentially significant problems. However, such difficulties may be alleviated by 
adequate linking and/or banking provisions. 
Overall, there appears to be no knock-out criterion why a cap-and-trade approach 
should not work in the shipping sector in practice. In fact, a maritime ETS has the 
potential to engage the maritime sector into cost-efficient emission reduction if 
designed to account for the special characteristics of the international shipping 
industry. 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Im Jahr 2007 hat der internationale Seeverkehr 870 Millionen Tonnen CO2 emittiert, 
und es wird erwartet, dass die Emissionen von Schiffen in Zukunft signifikant steigen 
werden. Im Rahmen des „Marine Environment Protection Committee“ (MEPC) der 
Internationalen Seeschifffahrts-Organisation (IMO) werden daher verschiedene 
Instrumente diskutiert, mit denen die CO2-Emissionen der internationalen Schifffahrt 
begrenzt werden sollen, unter anderem marktbasierte Instrumente. 
Auf Grundlage einer Fallstudie unter Schiffsbetreibern untersuchen wir in diesem 
Papier potentielle Auswirkungen eines weltweiten maritimen Emissionshandelssystems 
(ETS) auf Betrieb und Organisation Schifffahrt treibender Unternehmen. Aufbauend auf 
den Erkenntnissen der Fallstudie diskutieren wir welche Rolle bestimmte Probleme, die 
mit einem ETS gern in Verbindung gebracht werden (z.B. hohe Transaktionskosten), im 
maritimen Sektor spielen können und wie man diese durch eine geeignete 
Ausgestaltung des ETS vermeiden kann. 
Unsere Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die zusätzlichen Kosten, die für die Überwachung 
und Berichterstattung der Emissionen in einem maritimen ETS zu erwarten sind, eher 
gering ausfallen werden, da Schiffsbetreiber bereits jetzt, aus betriebswirtschaftlichen 
Gründen viele der benötigten Daten erfassen. Auch im Hinblick auf die Kosten für 
eventuelle Handelsaktivitäten ist zu erwarten, dass verglichen mit anderen operativen 
Kosten, wie zum Bespiel die Aufwendungen für Treibstoff und der damit verbundenen 
Finanzdienstleistungen, die zusätzlichen Ausgaben eher gering sein werden. 
Schwierigkeiten die im Zusammenhang mit einer absoluten Mengenbegrenzung der 
Emissionen in Verbindung gebracht werden, zum Beispiel eine hohe Volatilität der 
Zertifikatepreise oder unverhältnismäßig hohe Kosten in Zeiten einer unerwartet 
starken Nachfrage nach maritimen Transportleistungen, lassen sich nicht direkt von 
der Hand weisen. Allerdings könnten diese Probleme durch eine Verknüpfung des 
maritimen ETS mit anderen ETS und/oder der Möglichkeit Zertifikate anzusparen 
gelindert werden. 
Alles in allem scheint es kein K.O.-Kriterium dafür zu geben, dass ein maritimes ETS in 
der Praxis nicht funktionieren sollte. Vielmehr deuten unsere Resultate daraufhin, dass 
ein maritimes ETS für kosteneffiziente CO2-Emissionsvermeidung im internationalen 
Seeverkehr sorgen kann, sofern die Besonderheiten dieses Sektors bei der 
Ausgestaltung des maritimen ETS berücksichtigt werden. 
This paper is based on insights from a research project funded by the German Federal Ministry 
of Transport, Building and Urban Development (FE-Nr. 40.0388/2010). The final report of the 
project has been presented at the 63rd Session of the Marine Environmental Protection 
Committee as document MEPC63/Inf.14. The authors are solely responsible for the contents, 
which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the German Federal Ministry of Transport, 
Building and Urban Development. 
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Abstract 
International shipping is an important emitter of greenhouse gases. The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) is discussing different approaches to reduce maritime CO2 
emissions, in particular market-based mechanisms. In this paper, we assess potential 
implications of a maritime emission trading scheme (ETS) on the organisation and 
operations of shipping companies, primarily on the basis of a case study involving ship 
operators. Our results suggest that there is no knock-out criterion why a cap-and-
trade approach should not work in the shipping sector in practice. A maritime ETS has 
the potential to engage this sector into cost-efficient emission reduction if designed to 
account for the special characteristics of the international shipping industry. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2007, international shipping emitted 870 million tons of CO2, which represents 
about 2.7 percent of worldwide CO2 emissions (IMO, 2009a). The overall development 
of CO2 emissions of different transport modes are illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
Moreover, it is expected that the emissions from ships will continue to increase 
significantly in the near future (IMO, 2009a). In the context of general international 
climate negotiations, international shipping is generally excluded from the discussions 
at UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol does not include international shipping in the 
national inventories but points to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to find 
solutions to reduce CO2 in this sector (UNFCCC, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 1: Change of Transport CO2 Emissions (Index = 1990) 
 
In its second greenhouse gas study the IMO acknowledges the role the maritime 
industry plays in combating climate change (IMO, 2009a) and the current debate on 
how global shipping emissions can be reduced mainly takes place at the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), one of the committees. As a first result of 
the discussion, MEPC adopted the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) in 2011 which 
requires new build ships to comply with a minimum energy efficiency level per capacity 
mile (IMO, 2011d). However, given the demand for significant emission reductions in 
the sector, the search for a suitable instrument at IMO continues and, among other 
proposals, MEPC is considering the implementation of market based mechanisms 
(MBM) such a levy on bunker fuel or a worldwide maritime emission trading scheme 
(maritime ETS) to incentives the abatement of maritime CO2 emissions. While pricing 
carbon by means of a levy, tax or within cap-and-trade scheme has become a 
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standard tool of modern climate policy and is acknowledged by economists as an 
effective and cost-efficient instrument to fight the global increase of greenhouse 
gasses (GHG) (e.g. Stavins, 2003), implementing an MBM would be a novelty for IMO. In 
the past IMO has resorted mainly to technical and operational standards or regulations 
to tackle environmental issues. But in the context of global cumulative pollutants such 
as CO2 emissions and in the face of a broad set of emission abatement options 
involving different costs, as they are present in the international shipping industry in 
form of different technical and operational measures, MBMs seem particularly suitable. 
 
 
Figure 2: Emission Change 1995-2008 
 
Against this background, we investigate the potential effects of a possible future 
maritime CO2 emission regulation in the form of an MBM, in particular a maritime ETS – 
although most insights apply also to other MBMs establishing a financial incentive for 
CO2 abatement. Given the fictional character of our object of study – after all, up to 
now no MBM targeting maritime CO2 emissions has been implemented yet – we build 
on a proposal for a maritime ETS presented by Norway (IMO, 2010c). The Norwegian 
submission is to date one of the most detailed proposals for a worldwide maritime ETS 
in discussion at MEPC and can be seen as a good starting point for a future system. In 
this paper, however, we deviate from the Norwegian proposal in some areas in order 
study some design elements originally not envisaged in the original submission such 
as a limited scope of the ETS or alternative reporting schemes. Our analysis is based on 
a case study and relies on a series of interviews with experts that are active in a variety 
of different segments within the international shipping sector. We focus primarily on 
the implications on operations and organisations of international shipping companies. 
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More specifically, we discuss general design issues of a possible future regulation; the 
supply of allowances and use of revenues in a maritime ETS; monitoring, verification 
and reporting issues implied by a maritime ETS; and aspects of carbon management 
and mitigation. But, while the shipping operators’ viewpoint with respect to a future 
maritime emission regulation is without doubt crucial, there are also other aspects that 
need to be taken into account in order to be able to establish a well-functioning 
scheme, including, inter alia, broader economic effects and the overall environmental 
effectiveness of the system. For this reason, whenever appropriate, we take a more 
global perspective and evaluate vital design elements not just from a ship operator’s 
standpoint but also from an economic and behavioural point of view.  
So far, potential implications of MBMs aiming at a reduction of maritime emissions 
have been mainly assessed from a macroeconomic and general sectoral perspective. CE 
Delft (2010) for instance discuss the consequences of a maritime ETS and primarily 
studies overall economic effects for the shipping sector and different regions in the 
world. Bäuerle et al. (2010) in turn investigate the macroeconomic effects of an 
inclusion of shipping in the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A 
comprehensive analysis of the MBMs currently discussed at IMO is also undertaken by 
Miola et al. (2011). Furthermore – at least to our knowledge – the literature on the 
topic consists predominantly of rather theoretical discussions of individual design 
elements of MBMs and does not address the implications of such a regulation on 
individual stakeholders. With this paper we contribute to the discussion by not only 
assessing issues of a maritime ETS from a pure economic perspective but by 
complementing this with insights from the operators in the sector. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. First we explain the methodology 
employed in the case study. Next we present the insights from the case study. 
Subsequently we discuss if issues often associated to a cap-and-trade approach arise 
also in the context of a maritime ETS and outline how they can be addressed. We 
conclude with a brief summary. 
 
2 Methodology 
The empirical work within this paper is based on a case study among ship operators. 
Our data has been collected by means of semi-standardised expert interviews (Gläser 
and Laudel, 2009; Meuser and Nagel, 2005; Mayring, 2002). If appropriate, we 
complemented the different sections of the basic questionnaire with a brief 
introduction concerning the related design elements of a future maritime emission 
regulation. Hence, it was ensured that the interviewees understand the main design 
elements of such a system and are familiar with the market-based approach. 
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Prior to the actual interviews, a list of about 150 shipping companies from all around 
the world performing a wide variety of different maritime activities was compiled in 
order to identify potential experts for the case study. Subsequently potential interview 
partners were contacted via email and eventually via phone in order to determine their 
willingness to participate in the face-to-face interviews. As the relevant know-how is 
often spread over different experts within one company, where appropriate and 
possible, all persons most likely to be in charge with the mentioned issues of a future 
maritime ETS were included in the questioning. The average duration of the interviews 
was one and a half hours. To increase the shipping operators’ willingness to 
participate and to allow for detailed insights into their organisation and operations, we 
assured that the actual interview scripts, personal information of the interviewees and 
company names are not published. 
Overall, we conducted five in-depth interviews and one company provided a written 
statement instead of taking part in an interview. Four interviews were conducted face-
to-face on-site and one via telephone. Our case study covers a wide range of different 
shipping activities. The six participating companies are engaged in multi-modal 
transport, tankers, cruise shipping, container carriers, bulk shipping, project based 
transportation and offshore activities. The sample is also diverse with respect to the 
size of the fleet of the participating ship operators, the smallest having a fleet of about 
10 vessels and the biggest operating more than several hundred ships. All companies 
operate worldwide and have their headquarters in Europe, North America or East Asia. 
The interviewed experts themselves work mainly in departments responsible for 
corporate strategy, policy assessment or environmental projects. Of course, the results 
presented in the following hold first and foremost for the participating ship operators, 
and only give an indication of the effects that can generally be expected. 
 
3 Insights from the Case Study 
3.1 General Design Issues of a Possible Regulation 
Relevancy of Reducing Maritime Emissions 
The success of any approach regulating emissions depends crucially on the entities 
acceptance of the new regulation and their willingness to actively participate and 
contribute to the overall objective of the system. Therefore reducing shipping 
emissions must be seen as a relevant issue by ship operators in order to allow a 
scheme to be truly fruitful. 
All of the questioned ship operators acknowledge that reducing maritime emissions is 
a highly relevant and necessary task for the industry. That this issue is taken seriously 
can also be seen from the fact, that almost all of the interviewed operators have 
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already implemented some form of emission reduction targets on a voluntary basis or 
for example within their freely chosen commitments for ISO 140014. This proactive 
action demonstrates also that the discussion of MBMs at MEPC itself has so far only a 
marginal influence on the operations of shipping companies and a part of the surveyed 
operators see themselves as acting in advance of any regulation MEPC is likely to 
decide on in the near future. This statement mainly arises from the general doubt that 
MEPC will succeed in deciding upon a binding emission reduction scheme in the next 
few years. 
 
Information Basis and Involvement 
The identification and evaluation of possible implications of a maritime emission 
regulation for the shipping industry requires from the stakeholders a certain degree of 
knowledge and information on the discussion at MEPC and the regulation it is seeking 
to develop. As know-how and information often comes along with involvement, the 
operators were additionally asked whether they were involved in the process at MEPC 
or not. 
Most of the interviewed operators are following the discussion at MEPC attentively and 
consider themselves involved in the process. Their involvement consists primarily in 
providing background information and consultation on actual effects of a possible 
regulation and takes place mainly through industry associations or lobbying groups. 
But before the industry can truly grasp and assess the consequences of regulating 
emissions, the different proposals to MEPC need to become far more tangible. 
Moreover, from an industry perspective it appears that there needs to be more reliable 
information on the different approaches to regulating emissions. To that effect, the 
operators fear that probably most of the industry has not yet understood the 
implications of the different methods and hence cannot truly asses their implications. 
In this context two interviewees explicitly demand more information from the IMO on 
the issue, but in this regard also see industry groups not carrying out their duty to 
supply information sufficiently. 
 
General Attitude towards the Different Market Based Instruments 
In order to truly understand the responses and eventually also the motivation 
underlying the answers, before going into the details of a maritime ETS, the shipping 
                                              
4 Organisations certified by ISO 14001 are required to have an environmental management 
system in place and to target negative environmental effects arising from their business (see e.g. 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials for further information). 
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operators were asked about their general attitude towards the different market based 
methods. 
With respect to emission reductions, there is a general openness towards market-
based instruments. However, again, according to the shipping operators it is very 
difficult to have an opinion on this issue as long as the different proposals of MBMs at 
MEPC remain as vague as they currently are. As a result, only two of the questioned 
operators favour a particular approach, one being a worldwide maritime ETS (e.g., IMO, 
2010c, 2009b and 2009c), the other a leveraged incentive scheme (IMO, 2010g) based 
on efficiency improvements. The rest remains open with regard to the specific 
instrument, only noting that in theory all approaches seem to work and the industry 
will live up to the new regulation as long as the approach is made sufficiently clear to 
all involved stakeholders. But in the eyes of the interviewees, the important question is, 
whether the instrument chosen by MEPC successfully establishes incentives to actually 
reduce shipping emissions. 
 
Cost-Pass-Through and Demand for Climate-friendly Services 
For the operator concerned, or any other body designated to be liable for emissions 
from ships, one of the central aspects of any environmental regulation is if the 
additional costs caused from the regulation can be passed on, or whether the operator 
itself has to bear the costs of mitigation. This is independent of the chosen regulative 
approach, but depends mainly on the structure of the market the operator is engaged 
in. Generally speaking, the higher the price elasticity of demand, the smaller the share 
of additional costs that can be passed on. However, the shipping industry consists of a 
set of very different activities and hence various different markets, all having their own 
structure. As a consequence the ability to pass additional costs to the consumer varies 
considerably across the maritime industry. Thus the insights from this case study also 
vary depending upon the market segment in which the participating operators are 
active and the findings in this respect are limited to the core business of the interview 
partners.5 
The shipping operator active in the consumer discretionary sector on the basis of a 
business-to-consumer-direct relationship states that passing on additional costs is 
very difficult in their market segment. Although consumers are aware of whether a 
company operates in an environmentally friendly way or not, this has only a marginal 
                                              
5 A theoretical investigation of the ability of cost-pass-through in a maritime ETS is also 
provided by CE Delft (2010). See Alexeeva-Talebi (2011) or Korinek and Sourdin (2010), for a 
more general discussion on the issue, including an empirical assessment of cost-pass-through 
in the EU ETS. 
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effect on demand. So far, consumers in this sector are not willing to pay extra for 
environmental activities and price is the decisive factor in choice of shipping service 
supply. 
The interviewees from within the project based transportation, container and bulk 
cargo segment are of the opinion that in the long run, all additional costs will be 
passed on completely, in particular if the regulation is at a global scale. The tanker 
operator was not sure to which extent additional cost can be passed on, but assessed 
that they probably will be passed on in some form. 
The operator offering services for offshore activities also predicts that all additional 
cost can be passed on to their clients. Similar to the extra costs generated by other 
regulations, the company will most probably link its additional costs to the fuel 
consumption of its ships and pass it through to its clients, as it usually does with fuel 
costs. However it must be noted, that for this market segment fuel costs and most 
likely emission cost are currently not a significant cost factor for the clients. According 
to the same company, to some extent there exists a demand for green offshore 
services. Its clients, mainly from the petroleum industry, are becoming increasingly 
aware of environmental issues and are passing this down their supply chain, including 
offshore shipping activities. 
 
Scope of the Regulation 
Most proposals for MBMs presented at MEPC provide for a worldwide system regulating 
international maritime activities and define the single ship as the regulated entity. In 
particular in light of possible market distortions and possibilities for carbon leakage, 
maintaining the IMO principle of No More Favourable Treatment seems to be 
preferable. But in principal a less comprehensive scheme is also conceivable. The EU 
for instance is discussing whether shipping can be included in a regional emission 
regulation if the negotiations at MEPC in this context are not successful (EU, 2002), 
possibly similar to the inclusion of aviation in the existing EU emission trading scheme 
(EU ETS). 
All operators interviewed agree that a worldwide approach to regulating shipping 
emissions is appropriate and more fitting for the task than a regional approach, in 
particular because the shipping sector is a truly global industry. According to the 
operators, limiting the regulation of shipping emissions to a certain region would 
provoke competitive distortions. Some of the interviewees explicitly argue that, for 
example, an inclusion of the shipping sector in the EU ETS would lead to movement 
away from business in Europe as international shipping is more flexible compared to 
international aviation with respect to route optimization. However, one operator is of 
the opinion that this should not be a problem, as consumers are ultimately located for 
8 
 
instance in the EU or regions most likely to regulate emissions and hence traffic can 
only change to a certain degree without losing clients. Unnecessary red tape (i.e. 
excessive formal rules and bureaucracy) due to more complex monitoring and 
reporting processes and reduced environmental effectiveness are also identified by the 
operators as additional challenges associated with a regional approach. However, one 
operator points to the fact that the shipping industry in many cases already faces 
different local regulations, for example in terms of fuel sulphur content or bilge water 
discharges. Moreover, given that it is the smallest possible entity and the original 
source of emissions, all operators agree to define the ship as the entity that is 
regulated. With respect to exceptions, the companies advocate to making as few 
exceptions as possible, possibly using the same scheme as other maritime regulations 
such as MARPOL. 
 
3.2 Supply of Allowances and Use of Revenues in a maritime 
ETS 
Initial Allocation and Use of Revenues 
In any ETS, it is necessary to initially allocate allowances to the regulated entities. Due 
to its numerous advantages, such as no need for entity specific data on historical 
emissions, equal treatment of all entities, a comprehensible price signal, facile 
inclusion of new entrants, simple closure rules and the provision of revenues to the 
administration, the auctioning of allowances is regarded as the method of choice for 
the allocation of allowances in an ETS (e.g. Tietenberg, 2006; Benz et al. 2010). The 
Norwegian proposal also suggests the auctioning of allowances as the main allocation 
mechanism in a future ETS for shipping. 
 
Organisation and Resources for Procurement of Allowances 
The question of how the procurement of emission allowances will be organised is 
currently being discussed in each of the surveyed companies. As expected, larger 
shipping companies plan to organise the procurement internally by a central unit, 
whereas smaller companies will most likely outsource this task to a third party. Those 
who indicated an internal concept expect lower transaction and information costs as 
well as an easier fulfilment of any taxation obligations by assigning a central unit to do 
this task.  
As so far there has been no final decision regarding how maritime emissions shall be 
regulated, the additional resources that will be necessary for sourcing allowances have 
not yet been assessed. Nevertheless, based on their experience with the procurement 
of bunker fuel, one interviewed operator assumes that once the data collection is 
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automated at least three to six staff members could be needed to manage the system 
for a fleet of less than 75 ships (i.e. purchasing/trading allowances, possibly acquiring 
offsets such as CDM credits, and evaluating current and future demand). The operator 
managing a fleet of about 10 vessels however stated that no additional resources 
would have to be build up additionally and the tasks can be integrated in the 
infrastructure and processes the company already has. Another expert overseeing a 
group of several subsidiary companies also stressed that the distributed nature of an 
operators business may eventually increase the challenge of implementing a 
harmonised purchasing scheme, thereby substantially increasing required resources. 
The outsourcing by smaller companies aims at avoiding additional administrative 
burden and will help them to concentrate on their core business. One operator even 
reported from his experience of buying CERs for clients on a voluntary basis, that 
outsourcing will be easy and relatively cheap. This operator estimates extra costs of 
about 1 EUR per ton of CO2 when buying it from an external service provider or 
intermediary. 
 
Use of Revenues 
Auctioning of allowances generates revenues to the authority in charge of the 
allocation process. Apart from using the revenues to cover administrative costs caused 
by implementing the regulation, any authority has five fundamental non-exclusive 
policy options with respect to what can be done with the auctioning revenues (Pope 
and Owen, 2009): (1) redistribution to households, (2) redistribution to all or selected 
emitters (e.g. heavy emitters), (3) redistribution to businesses possibly carrying the 
burden of an emission regulation in the end, (4) earmarking for special purposes (in 
particular, for mitigation and adaptation efforts or the promoting technological 
progress), and finally (5) use as general revenue. In the context of a sectoral approach 
it is necessary to distinguish between revenue recycling within or outside the 
concerned sector. But given the five alternatives mentioned above, for the maritime 
industry only the options (2) redistribution to emitters, (3) redistribution to businesses 
possibly carrying the burden of an emission regulation in the end, and (4) earmarking 
for special purposes, are appropriate if revenues are to be spent directly in the sector. 
All of the interviewed experts would welcome the recycling of revenues within the 
maritime industry. Thereby, a special focus should be given to the promotion of 
technological progress, in particular with regard to fostering environmentally friendly 
and more fuel efficient technologies. In their view, this would improve the realisation 
of the emissions reduction potential of the shipping industry. Moreover, such a focus 
would be in line with the overall objective of the regulation, namely reducing maritime 
emissions. Some of the operators suggest that in practice, the support of emission 
reducing technologies could be organised similarly to the revenue recycling organised 
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by the Norwegian NOx Fund, which raises its capital from a levy on NOx emissions in 
Norwegian territorial waters. In this scheme, shipping operators can apply for grants if 
they plan to invest in technologies reducing NOx emissions and can subsequently 
prove the effectiveness of their investment. 
If however the revenues are used outside the maritime sector, for instance for 
mitigation, adaptation or general climate finance measures, in the opinion of some 
ship operators, the public must be made aware of the contribution the shipping 
industry is making to combat climate change. This would give shipping companies an 
additional argument for marketing purposes and would prevent that shipping being 
perceived as a dirty industry. Other operators on the other hand fear in such an event, 
the public might perceive the contribution of the maritime industry as an effort to buy 
itself out of its responsibility in reducing emissions, thereby giving the industry a 
negative image. 
Although reinvesting the revenues may increase the acceptance of the scheme among 
the regulated industry and therefore might appear attractive, from an economic 
perspective, there is no reason to limit revenue usage options to the maritime sector. 
As the environmental efficacy of an ETS is already guaranteed by the cap, the problem 
of whether to prioritise in-sector spending or a global approach is mainly a question of 
cost-efficiency and distributional issues which, in turn, are strongly linked to the 
political feasibility of an emission regulation. In order to have the possibility to select 
the most cost-efficient revenue recycling option, the authority should be able to 
choose from the complete set of possible options of how to spend the revenues. 
Limiting the usage of the revenues to the shipping sector, however, would confront the 
authority with an additional constraint, and consequently, it might not be able to 
optimally spend the revenues (Tol et al., 2008; Brett and Keen, 2000). Hence, from a 
cost-efficiency perspective, it does not make sense to earmark the revenues 
exclusively for the maritime industry. 
 
Trading of Allowances 
The possibility to trade allowances in an emission trading scheme allows for cost-
effective abatement in the system. In theory, emitters with low abatement costs will 
sell their allowances on the market, whereas emitters with high abatement costs can 
acquire allowances at a price lower than their marginal abatement costs. This trade is 
beneficial for both sides and it guarantees that abatement of emissions occurs where it 
is the cheapest option. In principle, ship operators would not be required to participate 
in the trading and could simply source their allowances at the auctions. Possible 
reasons for trading activities include compliance through secondary markets, profit 
maximisation, or risk minimisation. 
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Trading of Allowances – Organisation and Resources 
With respect to the possibility of trading allowances, a similar picture emerges as for 
the procurement of allowances. That is, larger shipping companies are likely to seize 
the opportunity to trade emission allowances by an in-house unit, whereas smaller 
companies rather plan to outsource this sort of activity. 
Again, given that so far there is no final decision regarding how maritime emissions 
shall be regulated, companies have not yet developed an overall concept for specific 
market-based instruments and are reluctant to truly evaluate the potentially necessary 
resources.  Accordingly, the surveyed operators could only provide rough estimates. As 
mentioned above, one interviewed expert assumes that at least three to six additional 
staff members are needed to manage the arising duties for a fleet of less than 75 
vessels while a different expert stated that for a fleet of about 10 vessels no extra 
resources appear to be necessary, always assuming that the data collection process is 
automated. Similar to the procurement of allowances, those companies which plan to 
trade will organise the trading activities in a centralised way. Depending on whether 
the allowances will be classified as pure financial instrument, this can be set at the 
company’s finance department. Otherwise, trading is probably organised within the 
fuel purchasing department of the companies since that is where the reporting will 
come through. The motivation for trading activities that interviewees stated are 
compliance reasons, profit maximisation, and risk minimisation. None of the 
interviewed operators consider trading as an additional future core business for their 
companies. 
 
Issues Related to the Fixed Amount of Emissions within a maritime ETS 
In any ETS the cap that defines the overall amount of emissions permitted, and thereby 
the quantity of allocated allowances in the system, is crucial for guaranteeing the 
environmental effectiveness of the scheme. But if the overall cap is not chosen 
adequately, in particular if it is set too stringent, it may pose problems for the shipping 
industry, and possibly also beyond the sector (for an example see Korinek and Sourdin, 
2010). Potentially, a too strict cap on emissions induces cost risk and can be a growth 
limiting issue. Moreover, in the interplay of prices and quantities on the market for 
emissions, fixing the available amount of allowances also results in a situation where 
all adjustments are captured by fluctuating prices. To some extent, this may lead to a 
rise in planning insecurity for ship operators, although this might prove to be a minor 
issue. 
In this context, the shipping operators identify basically two challenges. Most 
importantly, a fixed cap is considered as possible growth limiting issue if the supply of 
allowances is set too small. Given the expectations concerning the future development 
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of international trade and the associated increase in demand for transport services, the 
interviewed shipping experts apprehend that – depending on the actual cap – there will 
be not enough allowances on the market. In particular when the world economy is 
booming a fixed cap may cause problems. This is particularly true as a scheme must 
be able to deal with an increase in tonnage during the period for which an emission 
cap is defined. Secondly, a maritime ETS in general (and one without linking in 
particular) increases the uncertainty on behalf of the shipping industry due to volatile 
allowance prices. However, compared to the role that for example bunker fuel prices 
and bunker fuel price volatility play in shipping, the additional costs and risks 
associated with a maritime ETS are assessed as rather modest by most of the 
interviewees. 
As a way out of this dilemma, the interviewees suggest allowing the usage of 
allowances from other systems like CDM (linking) and enabling the fungibility of 
allowances between years (banking). Linking and banking are also frequently stated in 
the economic literature, as design option with which an ETS can alleviate the issues 
associated to a cap (e.g., Rubin, 1996; Jotzo and Betz, 2009; Jaffe et al., 2010). Linking 
makes it possible to use allowances and offsets from other markets, such as the EU 
ETS or the CDM market, for compliance in the maritime ETS. Opening a maritime ETS to 
other trading schemes increases the amount of available emission allowances and 
market liquidity is improved, thereby curbing growth limiting issues and price 
volatility. Moreover, by linking different emission markets, the prices for emissions are 
harmonised across the different systems, which in the end improves the overall 
efficiency of global climate policy. A banking mechanism in a maritime ETS in turn 
allows ships to reduce emissions below the cap when mitigation is cheap and to save 
allowances for periods in the future when high reduction costs are expected. Such 
provisions bring two main advantages. First, it extends the core benefit of an ETS, 
namely the cost-efficient realisation of a predefined emission reduction, to an 
intertemporal setting. Secondly, similar to the logic of linking it can have a positive 
effect in reducing the volatility of allowance prices. 
In particular with regard to linking the interviewees consider that these benefits could 
actually be realised in practice and state that if offsets could be used in a maritime ETS 
to be compliant with the regulation, this would most likely ease problems related to an 
absolute emission cap and the resulting fixed supply of allowances. Furthermore 
linking would allow a maritime ETS to secure additional mitigation options and hence 
decrease emission reduction costs within the scheme. Additionally they also see an 
advantage in an overall increase of demand and supply for allowances, which would 
lead to an increase in liquidity on the emission market. One of the operators would 
specifically appreciate links to project based offsets, because this would give 
companies the possibility to actively choose from where they source the offsets they 
eventually need to be compliant. The companies could then for example focus on 
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specific projects and eventually use them additionally for marketing or corporate social 
responsibility reasons. However some of the experts also acknowledge that linking the 
ETS to other instruments would make it more difficult to reduce emissions directly in 
the shipping sector and linking would make the design of the maritime ETS dependent 
on other players and would have to include more controls to prevent fraud. 
 
3.3 Monitoring, Reporting, Verification of Emissions 
Monitoring and Reporting at Present 
Any MBM requires that emissions are monitored, reported and verified for each legal 
entity. At present all of the interviewed companies already collect fuel consumption 
data and apart from two operators who have these figures available on a voyage basis, 
most operators gather the data on a daily basis. Generally the data includes bunkering 
activities, quantity of fuel used, fuel specification, sulphur content and sometime also 
emissions. Occasionally the data is also related to information regarding the cargo 
carried, distance travelled, ship type and cruise speed. The data is thereby based on 
the bunker delivery note6 (BDN), active monitoring, tank readings or where applicable 
derivations using emission factors. All operators collect the data centrally using some 
form of database management system and most of them have the data communicated 
frequently from the ships to the headquarter via satellite link. 
The motivation for the current monitoring and reporting efforts by the operators is 
mainly to monitor performance and costs as well as the operators’ obligations in the 
framework of their commitment for ISO 14001 or other voluntary environmental 
commitments. In addition, in some cases these systems have been implemented partly 
as a result of demands from clients, who ask ship operators to report their 
environmental performance. Thus, some clients pass the environmental reporting 
duties within their organisation down to their suppliers, inter alia the shipping lines. 
But sometimes, such monitoring and reporting activities are also triggered through 
currently existing regulations for instance such as the Norwegian NOx tax 
arrangement. Because this regulation, as geographically limited in scope, it requires 
operators to collect very detailed data regarding the fuel consumption on the ships. 
 
 
                                              
6 Bunker delivery notes are records of fuelling transactions which must be available for 
inspection on ships on international voyages. 
14 
 
Resources for Monitoring and Reporting – Company Level 
In the view of the questioned shipping operators, the actual burden of a monitoring 
and reporting system is dependent on how accurate and how often measurements 
have to be taken and reported and whether the processes have to be verified. Thus the 
interviewed experts note that the additional burden can only be estimated roughly 
until the precise requirements of a regulation become public. Generally, because most 
operators would seek compliance using the processes they have implemented already, 
the additional burden is very much dependent upon how much the requirements differ 
from the company’s current practice. In particular, if an automated report generated 
from a database is sufficient and the documents only have to be produced when 
vessels are in harbour so that a voyage-based system is sufficient, then the additional 
burden for companies will be small. If a daily report is required, then companies which 
do not have a fully automated system would face a considerable extra burden. Some 
ship operators consider the Norwegian proposal to demand an unnecessary level of 
accuracy and verification. This holds particularly true for the required surveys of the 
ship, which, in the eyes of the operators, would unnecessarily detain vessels from their 
usual operations. Most companies currently have one person who deals with 
environmental reporting. For a non-automated system, this is a full time job for an 
annual environmental report. In case the emission data from the ships is required more 
frequently, the additional burden increases accordingly. Automation can reduce the 
time required, if there is an automated system where each ship can enter its own 
information into the companies’ database and the generation of reports is also 
automated.  
 
Resources for Monitoring and Reporting – Ship Level 
Ultimately, the information for emissions monitoring has to come from the crew of 
each ship. Therefore, the requirement to monitor and report emissions represents an 
additional administrative burden for the crews. The ship operators are of the opinion 
that if the reporting follows a procedure based on the bunkering activities of the ships, 
for example by using the BDN, with a simple calculation of emissions = fuel use × 
emissions factor, which is constant for each fuel type and for each voyage, then the 
additional burden would be slight. But if the actual fuel consumption of each ship 
would have to be monitored and eventually reported, this would be very costly, as 
special measurement equipment would be necessary and very individual fuel-
consuming units on board would have to be monitored and documented. Overall, daily 
and direct emissions reporting would represent a significant administrative burden for 
the crews. Disregarding equipment cost, according to one operator, this would amount 
to approximately one person working full time on the ship, unless the process is highly 
automated. If the monitoring and reporting process on the ship is part of a system in 
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which the crews log the respective data online and thereby transmit it to the 
company’s central database directly, then the administrative burden would be 
minimised for both the ships’ crews and the operating company. But again, the 
additional burden depends crucially on how much the requirements differ from the 
company’s current practice. Overall, most of the interviewed experts estimate the 
additional burden from any new regulation to be small. 
 
Potential Advantages to Companies from Monitoring and Reporting for an ETS 
Detached from compliance with actual regulations, monitoring and reporting efforts 
may possibly allow for additional benefits to be realised. It is obvious for instance that 
without documenting the actual fuel use and emissions, efficiency gains are hard to be 
identified and implemented. Alternatively, given the wide variety of monitoring 
procedures that the different interviewed companies already have in place, a 
standardised approach to monitoring and reporting could be expected to improve the 
standard of environmental management in the industry as a whole. In other industries, 
such additional benefits have included inter alia, the direction of management 
attention to efforts to reduce fuel consumption in operations. 
Most operators interviewed were able to give examples of positive effects of 
monitoring and reporting fuel consumption and emissions, which mainly related to 
awareness of the fuel consumption implications of operational practices such as 
running positioning systems for long periods of time instead of anchoring, or sailing 
with powerful deck lights switched on in daylight. However, the operators have doubts 
whether any additional benefits can be secured through new requirements, because 
most of the advantages of monitoring and reporting are already captured through their 
efforts within ISO 14001 or under other regulations, for example MARPOL, or through 
voluntary action. 
 
3.4 Carbon Management and Mitigation 
For ship operators, an active carbon management would be necessary not just merely 
to be compliant with the regulation of maritime emissions, but most notably to 
minimise the costs associated with a cap-and-trade system. This means in particular 
that regulated entities, respectively the operator responsible for compliance, assess 
their mitigation options and their potential to change to a low emission fleet. 
 
 
 
16 
 
Assessment of Mitigation Options 
All ship operators interviewed acknowledge that energy efficiency is already an 
important consideration in ship operations. Most of the companies had undertaken an 
assessment of their CO2 mitigation options, technical as well as operational. One 
company had in fact initiated an intensive discussion process specifically including the 
crews of its ships and on the basis of a questionnaire developed a catalogue of options 
focusing in particular on how emissions can be saved during operations. 
 
Current and Past Activities to Increase Fuel Efficiency and Reduce Emissions 
The interviewees reported a wide range of current and past activities aiming at the 
reduction of energy consumption and emissions. Besides operational measures, an 
important area for potential emissions reduction is in the modification of ship designs. 
Potential options in this area have been widely discussed among the operators and are 
well known in the industry. The same holds true for more radical options reducing the 
emission of new builds. In contrast to operational measures, the actual implementation 
of technical options has so far been limited. In the interviews ship operators identified 
several reasons for this. The lifetime of ships is reported to be in the range of 30-40 
years. Potentially this implies a 30-40 years’ period before a new technology is fully 
deployed. This length of time can only be reduced if the technology can be retrofitted 
at a docking. Moreover, the ship operators describe their influence on the design of 
new ship to this regard as limited. Since the shipbuilding industry is globalised and has 
relatively few major companies all offering products of similar performance and 
standards, small companies in particular have to buy off-the-shelf-designs or face a 
significant increase in investment costs. Finally with regard to the slow adaptation of 
new technologies, there is a need for support for further demonstration projects on a 
wider range of ships, to show whether these technologies can give fuel savings under a 
wide range of operating conditions on different routes before they will be deployed on 
a big scale. In fact several operators had been involved in various research and 
technology development projects, both for energy saving technologies and for 
emissions monitoring and reporting. Participation in technology development projects 
is intended to provide an assessment of how far the technology has been developed 
and to what extent it can be deployed in the fleet. 
Besides technological mitigation options, some of the companies have also 
implemented organisational structures to reduce emissions from their processes. One 
company for example has introduced emissions intensity reduction targets, while 
another has organised an internal competition to reward low carbon operations. The 
achievement of carbon neutrality through carbon offsetting is also a part of some 
companies’ environmental management strategy. 
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4 Discussion 
After having presented our insights from the interviews, we now briefly recapitulate the 
main benefits and issues of applying a cap-and-trade scheme. Subsequently, we 
discuss whether problems often associated to an ETS arise also in the context of a 
maritime ETS and outline how they can be addressed. From an economical theoretical 
perspective, applying a cap-and-trade approach seems to be an ideal instrument to 
cope with negative externalities generated through economic activity and has been 
discussed extensively in the economic literature (e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1971; 
Montgomery, 1972; Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1982; Newell and Stavins, 2003; Stavins, 
2003). Essentially, an ETS allows to secure two main benefits. First, the environmental 
effectiveness of the scheme is guaranteed. In an ETS, the cap defines the overall 
amount of permitted emissions in the system. Hence, policy makers can choose a 
priori an overall limit for emissions over a certain time period and can thereby 
effectively control the total amount of pollution arising from emissions. Second, it 
achieves a given environmental benefit at least cost, thus is a cost-efficient 
mechanism. By constraining the allowed amount of emissions, a scarcity is artificially 
created and a price for emissions develops. As a consequence, the cap ensures that 
regulated entities treat their emissions like a regular factor of production and deploy it 
rationally in their production process. The ability to trade emission allowances 
provides for the equalisation of marginal emission abatement costs across all involved 
entities. In theory, emitters with low abatement costs will sell their allowances on the 
market, whereas emitters with high abatement costs can buy allowances at a 
comparatively low price. In the end, both entities benefit from this trading activity, and 
mitigation of emissions takes place where it is the lowest-cost option. 
Given these benefits, it appears to be reasonable to also consider an emission trading 
scheme as an instrument to reduce emissions from international shipping. But in 
practice the implementation of such a scheme may involve several difficulties. Emission 
trading is often associated with high transaction costs for the regulated entity (e.g., 
Stavins, 1995; Cason and Gangadharan, 2003; Heindl, 2012). These consist primarily 
of expenditures for monitoring and reporting as well as costs induced by potential 
trading activities. In reality, carbon leakage may pose another issue for an ETS. In the 
context of shipping, carbon leakage relates mainly to the problem of shipping firms 
changing their activities in order to avoid being subject to the regulation, for example 
by adapting their operation patterns. Last but not least, the cap itself is at times seen 
as a critical element of an ETS. The international shipping industry is acknowledged to 
be a highly cyclical sector (OECD, 2009 and 2011), and since the cap within an ETS sets 
a fixed amount of supplied emission allowances, a variation in the demand for 
allowances can heavily affect the price of emissions. This may result in increased price 
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uncertainty. In addition, in times of high demand for shipping activities, a too strict 
limit on emissions could result in excessive operation costs for ship operators. 
If it is to be expected that such issues will arise in the context of a maritime emission 
trading scheme, they will also have to be taken into account in the design of the 
system. Here policy makers may benefit from the flexibility of a cap-and-trade 
approach with respect to different design elements and design the scheme while 
taking into account the particularities of the shipping sector. 
Obviously, besides the intended emission costs to incentivise abatement, a maritime 
ETS will also entail transaction costs for ship operators. Our case study gives a first 
indication of how big these are. For business reasons, ship operators already 
undertake comprehensive monitoring and reporting efforts for bunker fuel usage and 
at date, most companies have fuel consumption data available, at least on a voyage 
basis. Hence, if a maritime ETS makes use of the monitoring and reporting processes 
in place at present, this would involve companies in almost no extra administrative 
effort for emissions monitoring and reporting, as there is a direct relation between 
bunker fuel use and shipping emissions. With regard to the costs for potential trading 
activities it is to be expected that compared to other operational costs, e.g. bunker fuel 
and financial services associated to it (e.g. hedging activities), the additional 
expenditures will be rather small.  
Limiting the potential for carbon leakage is particularly crucial when regulating mobile 
entities and services such as it would be the case for international shipping. This calls 
for a comprehensive approach to maritime emission trading which is applied 
worldwide and makes as few exceptions as possible. Such an approach is also favored 
by the interviewed ship operators and they point out that this would additionally limit 
red tape compared to an emergence of multiple nonrelated regional schemes.The 
issues associated to a cap cannot be ruled out as easily and are also identified by the 
interviewed experts as potentially significant problems. However, they may be 
alleviated by adequate linking and/or banking provisions.7 Linking makes it possible to 
use allowances and offsets from other emission markets, such as the currently existing 
EU ETS or the CDM market, for compliance in the maritime ETS. Opening a maritime 
ETS to other trading schemes increases the amount of available emission allowances 
and market liquidity is improved, thereby curbing growth limiting issues and price 
                                              
7 The economic literature acknowledges also the implementation of price ceilings and price 
floors as possibilities for cost containment, as it is for instance foreseen in the Australian 
emission trading scheme (Jotzo and Betz, 2009; Wood and Jotzo, 2011). Price ceilings and price 
floors introduce elements of price-based policy instruments in a quantitive approach, resulting 
in a hybrid model. However, in this study we focus on emission trading in its pure form and 
defer the discussion of a hybrid approach for the shipping sector to future research. 
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volatility. Moreover, by linking different emission markets, the prices for emissions are 
harmonised across the different systems, which in the end improves the cost efficiency 
of global climate policy. A banking mechanism in turn would allow ships to reduce 
emissions below the cap when mitigation is cheap and to save allowances for periods 
in the future when high reduction costs are expected. Such a provision brings two 
main advantages. First, it extends the core benefit of an ETS, namely the cost-efficient 
realisation of a predefined emission reduction, to an intertemporal setting (Ellerman et 
al., 2000; Stavins et al., 2003, Schleich et al. 2006). Secondly, it can also have a 
moderate effect on the volatility of allowances prices because in times of extreme 
prices, emitters can draw from saved emission allowances (Nordhaus, 2007). In 
principle, borrowing, the direct complement to banking, secures the same advantages 
(Nordhaus, 2007). But the risk of borrowing is that firms may never actually reduce 
emissions in the future or may undermine early emission reduction which can result in 
upwards pressure on future mitigation costs if future abatement costs are not 
substantially reduced. For similar reasons, also the interviewed ship operators oppose 
borrowing. Hence borrowing should only be permitted under strict conditions, for 
instance quantity or time limits (Brunner et al., 2009). 
 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
International shipping is an important emitter of greenhouse gases and given the 
expectations concerning the future development of international trade and the 
associated increase in demand for transport services, emissions of ships are likely to 
increase significantly in the future. How maritime CO2 emissions can be reduced best 
is a hot topic, not only for the parities at IMO but also for ship operators. In this paper 
we assessed potential implications of a maritime emission trading scheme on the 
organisation and operations of shipping companies, primarily on the basis of a case 
study involving ship operators. Although we focussed on a maritime ETS, most of the 
insights in our paper apply also to other MBMs aiming at the reduction of maritime CO2 
emissions. On the basis of our results, we subsequently discussed whether and how a 
maritime ETS needs to make special provisions to account for three frequently raised 
criticisms in the context of cap-and-trade, namely high transaction costs, carbon 
leakage and issues associated to a fix cap on emissions. At large, there appears to be 
no knock-out criterion why a cap-and-trade approach should not work in the shipping 
sector in practice. In fact, a maritime ETS has the potential to engage the maritime 
sector into cost-efficient emission reduction if designed to account for the special 
characteristics of the international shipping industry such as already existing 
monitoring processes and long investment cycles. 
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